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I. THE DuTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
In recent years there has been much written in the area of labor law
concerning the union's general duty of fair representation to the
members of the bargaining unit.' Simply stated, the duty of fair repre-
sentation is an obligation imposed upon the union as exclusive bargain-
ing agent for a group of employees "to refrain from action which makes
its individuals and minorities worse off than they would be in its
absence."' This requirement, inferred from federal labor statutes, is
designed to compensate the individual member of the bargaining unit
for relinquishing the right to negotiate his own contract with his
employer. 3 While the union's duty of fair representation is primarily
concerned with the representation that each individual receives, the
union, of course, must also be responsive to the wishes of any majority.
This antithetical characterization-a duty running from the union to
a group of individuals and to an individual member-has been recog-
nized in both contract negotiation and contract administration. How-
ever, it is uncertain whether the individual's right to fair representation
is tempered by the union's group-oriented function of bargaining agent
for contract negotiation.4
1. For bibliographic references to discussions of this aspect of labor law, see Comment,
19 CASr W. Rrs. L. Rv. 146-47 n.2 (1967); Note, The Duty of Fair Representation and its
Applicability When a Union Refuses to Process an Individual's Grievance, 20 S.C.L. REv.
253, 260 n.42 (1968).
2. Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VIiL. L. REv. 151, 157 (1957). But see Don-
nelly v. United Fruit Co., 75 N.J. Super. 383, 395, 183 A.2d 415, 421 (Super. Ct. 1962),
aff'd, 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963), where the court said the duty of fair representation
"includes an obligation to act for the collective good of its members."
3. "[The duty of fair representation] is inferred by the court as a balance to the exclu-
aiveness of the union's power to represent unit employees and to assure all such employees
adequate representation." Fanning, Individual Rights in the Negotiation and Administra-
tion of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 19 LA. L.J. 224, 226 (1968). "Thus the duty of
fair representation turns out to be the obverse of the coin of exclusive bargaining
capacity, imposed in order to remove constitutional doubts concerning Congress' power
to grant exclusive bargaining power." Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under
Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215, 1233 (1964).
4. Sec Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 622, 657 (1956).
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The Supreme Court, in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,5 initially rec-
ognized the duty of fair representation as an essential part of the
exclusive bargaining power conferred upon the union by section 2 of
the Railway Labor Act.6 To make the same duty applicable under the
National Labor Relations Act,1 the Court relied on Steele in Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman.8 While both of these cases dealt with contract
negotiation, the statutory provision relied upon by the Huffman Court
also provided for contract administration.9 Fourteen years later in
Vaca v. Sipes,'° the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the duty of
fair representation in the contract administration function and estab-
lished guidelines for proof of the breach of the duty.
Vaca involved a potentially serious breakdown of the union-manage-
ment relationship because the individual was aggrieved by both his
union's and employer's administration of the contract."1 This type of
situation typically occurs when an employee has been "wrongfully"
discharged by his employer, and the legality of the discharge can be
settled by the union's invocation1 2 of the collective bargaining agree-
ment's grievance system.'2 If the union considers the claim unfounded
or the outcome too uncertain for a confrontation with management,
the union may refuse to process the grievance, and the claim will
lapse for lack of another contractual remedy. The Vaca Court held
that in such a situation the union has breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation if its action can be characterized as "arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or in bad faith"'14 or if it processed the grievance in a "perfunctory
fashion."' 5
5. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
6. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1964).
8. 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
9. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
10. 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
11. A brief of amicus curiae, urging reversal of the employee's award against his union,
was filed by Swift & Co., the employer. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 174 (1967).
12. Usually only the union, acting on behalf of the employee, can invoke the later
steps in the grievance system. See note 31 infra; Brown v. Truck Drivers & Helpers
Local No. 355, 264 F. Supp. 776 (D. Md. 1967); cf. White v. General Baking Co., 263
F. Supp. 264 (D.N.J. 1964). In Retail Clerks Locals 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc.,
341 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 839 (1965), only the employees, and not the
union acting in their behalf, could invoke the arbitration procedure in the grievance
system.
13. Ninety per cent of the collective bargaining agreements in the United States con-
tain grievance and arbitration provisions. 2 BNA Co.zcrxvz BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS
AND CoNTRArs 51:6-7 (1965).
14. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
15. Id. at 191.
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The recognition of the duty in the contract administration function
seems only logical and necessary. If the union is to represent the em-
ployees it should do so throughout the employment process. Also, since
the union is the adversary of management during the negotiation pro-
cess, it should not later be its ally in contract administration. But, since
the goal of federal labor laws is to prevent industrial strife by encourag-
ing harmonious relations between management and labor, many diffi-
culties arise when the union refuses to comply with an individual
member's request that it exercise its contract administration powers
to satisfy his grievance against management.
II. BREACH OF THE DuTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION AS AN UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE: JURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS
A. Exclusive Jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
The major ramification of a finding that a union's breach of its duty
of fair representation is an unfair labor practice'16 is that the NLRB
assumes exclusive jurisdiction of the matter. 7 In Miranda Fuel Co.'5
the NLRB held for the first time that a breach of the duty of fair rep-
resentation was an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act.' 0 Though the Second Circuit refused
enforcement, it did not expressly reject the NLRB's determination
that the breach was an unfair labor practice.20 Three years later in
Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB,21 the Fifth Circuit en-
16. Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
US.C. § 158 (1964), outlines prohibited conduct by employer and union which constitute
unfair labor practices. The prohibitions on employer conduct are contained in subsection
(a) and prohibitions on union conduct are in subsection (b). Subsections (d) and (e) are
applicable to the conduct of both the employer and union.
17. See Note, Federal Pre-emption in Labor Relations, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 128 (1968).
18. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964). "This right of employees is a statutory limitation on
bargaining representatives, and we conclude that Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act accord-
ingly prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory representative capacity,
from taking action against any employee upon considerations or classifications which
are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair." Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962),
enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
20. Judge Medina held that the breach of the duty of fair representation was not an
unfair labor practice. Judge Lumbard explicitly did not reach the unfair labor practice
question but concurred with Judge Medina's alternative ground for decision--insufficient
evidence to support a breach of the duty. Judge Friendly dissented, saying that the breach
of the duty was an unfair labor practice. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963).
21. 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), enforcing, Local 12,
United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964).
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forced an NLRB decision by relying on the Miranda Fuel doctrine.
If the Miranda Fuel doctrine were to prevail, all breaches of the duty
of fair representation would be redressed by Board proceedings and
would be subject to the discretionary enforcement authority of the
General Counsel of the NLRB.22 Thus, failure by the General Counsel
of the NLRB to initiate Board proceedings would, in most cases,
effectively prevent a complete determination of the merits of the union
member's asserted breach of the fair representation duty.
B. State Court Jurisdiction
Early exceptions to the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction were an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Gonzales,23 and in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon.24
Gonzales held state court jurisdiction proper where "the potential
conflict [between the state law and remedies and the NLRB] is too
contingent, too remotely related to the public interest expressed in the
Taft-Hartley Act."25 In other words, the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB does not attach to activity which is merely a peripheral con-
cern of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act).20
State courts had jurisdiction in "interests ... deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility" according to Garmon.27
The loss of exclusive jurisdiction by the NLRB is undesirable 28 as
there will be a multitude of forums available to the complainant, and
the opportunities for a consistent application of the fair representation
duty will be diminished. However, beneficial results may occur. The
courts can potentially provide a forum for speedy redress of grievances,
thus preventing the types of industrial strife to which the Board could
not quickly respond because of its more cumbersome procedures.20
C. Concurrent Jurisdiction-The NLRB, State and Federal Courts
The recent case of Vaca v. Sipes0 presented to the Supreme Court
the issue of jurisdiction for breaches of the union's duty of fair repre-
22. Notes 71-77 infra and accompanying text.
23. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
24. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
25. 556 Us. at 621.
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1964).
27. 359 U.S. at 244.
28. See Note, Refusal to Process a Grievance, the NLRB, and the Duty of Fair Repre.
sentation: A Plea for Pre-emption, 26 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 593 (1965).
29. See R. S=T,. L. MAEmutIFLD & T. ST. ANToINE, LABOR RELAT iONS LAW 66-70 (4th
ed. 1968). See also S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947).
80. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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sentation. An employee sued his union in a Missouri court, alleging
that the duty of fair representation had been breached when the union
had not processed his allegedly wrongful discharge to arbitration. Arbi-
tration was the fifth and final step in the grievance system.31 The
grievant prevailed at trial and on appeal in the state supreme court.
The union, in urging dismissal of the action for want of jurisdiction,
argued, inter alia, that state court jurisdiction was preempted by the
NLRB since a breach of the duty of fair representation was an unfair
labor practice.3 2 A divided Court held that the NLRB did not have
exclusive jurisdiction even though the breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation may also be an unfair labor practice.33
The Supreme Court's holding that both the NLRB and the courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over breaches of the duty of fair repre-
sentation is limited by the requirement that uniform federal labor
standards must be used in all courts.3 4 Applying this standard, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court's decision was reversed, because the federal defi-
nition of a breach of fair representation was ignored.35 Specifically, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that a grievant, regardless of forum,
must show that the union acted in bad faith toward him in order to sus-
tain a breach of fair representation claim. 36 The emphasis on continuity
of standards undergirds the application of labor legislation. Earlier the
Court said that "[s]tate law which frustrates the effort of Congress to
stimulate the smooth functioning of [the collective bargaining] pro-
cess... strikes at the very core of federal labor policy. '37 Forum shop-
ping will be diminished as no advantage will be available to a party
because of a particular state's labor policy. The choice of the court,
then, will probably depend on economic and procedural matters. The
choice between the NLRB and the courts may depend on the type of
relief desired and the probability of getting the NLRB's General
31. In steps one and two, either the aggrieved employee or the Union's representative
presents the grievance first to [the employer's] department foreman, and then in
writing to the division superintendent. In step three, grievance committees of the
Union and management meet, and the company must state its position in writing
to the Union. Step four is a meeting between [the employer's] general superintendent
and representatihes of the National Union. If the grievance is not settled in the
fourth step, the National Union is given power to refer the grievance to a specified
arbitrator.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175 n.3 (1967).
32. Brief for Petitioners at 39-45, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
33. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186-87 (1967).
34. Id. at 189; Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
35. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 188-89 (1967).
36, Id. at 190.
37, Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
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Counsel to issue a complaint. Thus with the ruling in Vaca the em-
ployee now has a choice in the type and situs of the proceeding.
III. PROCEDURAL CHOICES FOR ASSERTING A BREACH
OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
A. Arbitration
In the Steelworkers8 cases the Supreme Court in 1960 announced
its preference for an often used grievance procedure-binding arbitra-
tion.39 The Court stated that no party could be forced to arbitrate
unless he had agreed to do so.40 But if an arbitration clause had been
included in the collective bargaining agreement, it could be enforced
by court order.41 Even though arbitration is the stipulated procedure,
often the arbitration clause must be interpreted by the courts to deter-
mine if the facts of the grievance are those specified by the clause, thus
invoking the procedure. 42 Further, the courts can review the arbitra-
tor's decision to determine whether a contract's arbitration clause gave
the arbitrator the power to fashion the remedy given.43
The argument may be raised that a particular controversy is not
within the purview of the arbitration clause. 44 Because of the Supreme
Court's preference for arbitration, lower courts repeatedly reject this
argument and find that the usual arbitration clause covers nearly all
disputes. 45 This emphasis on employing the arbitration process strength.
88. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
89. See, e.g., Guille v. Mushroom Transp. Co., 425 Pa. 607, 229 A.2d 903 (1967).
40. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
41. Lee v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 271 F. Supp. 635 (W.D. Va. 1967).
42. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
43. Torrington Co. v. Local 1645, UAW, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966).
44. See Stillpass Transit Co. v. Teamsters Local 103, 382 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1015 (1968); Electric Alarm Trade Ass'n v. Electrical Workers Local 8,
271 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Local 283, UAW v. Wisconsin Motor Corp., 266 F. Supp.
899 (E.D. Wis. 1967); Richardson v. International Minerals Corp., 64 L.R.R.M. 2241 (M.D.
Tenn. 1967); Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 262 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
modified on appeal, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
45. See Electric Alarm Trade Ass'n v. Electrical Workers Local 3, 271 F. Supp. 720
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Local 283, UAW v. Wisconsin Motor Corp., 266 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Wis.
1967); H.K. Porter Co. v. Local 37, United Steelworkers of America, 264 F. Supp. 203
(S.D.W. Va. 1967); Richardson v. International Mineral Corp., 64 L.R.R.M. 2241 (M.D.
Tenn. 1967); Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 262 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
modified on appeal, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967). But see Dis-
trict 50, UMW v. Chris-Craft Corp., 385 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1967).
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ens the ties between union and employer by making them confront
each other within the framework of their bargained-for grievance
procedure.4 6
If an employee is dissatisfied with the arbitration decision there is
little he can do. The courts have refused to look at the merits of the
grievance.4 7 If the matter had been properly submitted to arbitration,
they only determine whether or not the arbitrator exceeded his grant
of authority from the collective bargaining agreement.48 The agree-
ments often provide that as the claim is processed through the griev-
ance system towards ultimate arbitration each step is final and binding
unless appealed to the next step.49 The last step, arbitration, usually is
final and cannot be challenged in court.r0 Therefore, if the employee
46. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)
(1964) provides: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties [union and
employer] is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agree-
ment,"
47. United Steelworkers of America v. Caster Mold &- Machine Co., 345 F.2d 429
(6th Cir. 1965).
48. Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 214 (D.S.C. 1967). Statutes providing for
review of arbitration awards usually require fraud or corruption by a party or an
arbitrator, or that the conduct of the abitrator was prejudicial before an award can be
vacated. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1964); ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 842 (1960); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
1 12-1512 (Supp. 1967) (decline to confirm an award rather than vacating an award);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-509 (1962) (courts shall have power over awards on equitable prin-
ciples as heretofore); CAL. Cry. PRO. CODE § 1286.2 (Deering 1967); CoLO. R. Crv. P. 109(g);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-418 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.07 (1943); GA. CODE ANN.
If 7-111, -219, -220 (1947); HAWAn REv. LAWS § 188-9 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-907
(1948); ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 10, § 11 (1959) (any legal defects); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-216
(1968); IowA CODE ANN. § 679.12 (1950) (for any legal and sufficient reasons); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 5-211 (1964); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 417.018 (1963) (courts shall have power over
awards on equitable principles as heretofore); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 958 (1964);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 7, § 12 (1968); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150C, § 11 (1965); Micr. STAT.
ANN. § 17.454(25) (1968) (petition for Writ of certiorari or other such process as may be
appropriate); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.19 (Supp. 1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 290 (1956); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 435.100 (1959); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-201-7 (1964); NE. REv. STAT.
1 25-2115 (1964) (for any legal and sufficient reasons); NEv. REv. STAT. § 614.040 (1967)
(for matter of law apparent on the record); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 542.8 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-8 (1952); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7511 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-559 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29-08 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 170 (1963);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9-18 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1904 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN.
1 23-514 (1955) (for any legal and sufficient reasons); TEX. REv. CrV. STAT. art. 248 (1959)
(for matter of law apparent on the record); UTAn CODE ANN. § 78-31-16 (1953); VA. CODE
ANN. 1 8-506 (1957); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-10-4 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.10, 298.10
(1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1048.14 (Supp. 1967); UNtrOPR ARBiTRATiON Aar § 12.
49. See Heath v. Central Truck Lines, 195 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See
also Note, Section 301(a) and the Employee: An Illusory Remedy, 35 FoRDHAm L. REV.
517, 518-28 (1967).
50, See Ford v. General Elec. Co., 395 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1968); Haynes v. United
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pursues this contractual remedy he is excluded from the courts. If the
employee does not pursue this "chosen" grievance procedure, the
failure to exhaust his contractual remedy will be a defense to court
action.5 1 In short, the courts prefer that disputes be settled by the use
of the arbitration clauses usually included in collective bargaining
agreements.52 The effect of this is to deny the employee a choice of
arbitration or court redress. The choice has been made by his union in
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitra-
tion clause.
Neither the choice of an arbitration clause by the union nor the
courts' preference for arbitration is harmful per se. But the inclusion
of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement furthers
the union's position as a representative of group rights rather than
individual rights in the administration of the contract.53 This policy of
compromising the individual's rights in the grievance system is further
emphasized in Vaca. The Court said that not all grievances need be
processed to arbitration, but that they could be settled in good faith
by the union alone without consulting the employee.5 4 Use of any
other system, the Court said, would destroy "the employer's confidence
in the union's authority."55
However, Vaca does liberalize the exhaustion principle. Instead of
an absolute requirement that the employee pursue redress within the
available grievance system, the employee need only attempt 0 to in-
voke the grievance machinery by asking the union to process his com-
plaint.57 If unsuccessful in his attempt to have the union invoke the
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966); Heath v. Central Truck Lines,
195 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Davenport v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp.,
206 So. 2d 526 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Guille v. Mushroom Transp. Co., 425 Pa. 607, 229
A.2d 903 (1967).
51. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965); Bsharah v. Eltra Corp.,
394 F.2d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 1968).
52. Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 Yata L.J.
1215 (1964); note 46 supra.
53. "[R]un-of-the-mill disputes should be settled by the union, on behalf of the em-
ployee, because such a procedure substantially assists the union as the employees' repre-
sentative." Rothlein v. Armour & Co., 391 F.2d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 1968).
54. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967).
55. Id. at 191.
56. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
57. "Union interest in prosecuting employee grievances is dear. Such activity comple-
ments the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative by permitting it to
participate actively in the continuing administration of the contract. In addition, con-
scientious handling of grievance claims will enhance the union's prestige with employees."
Id. at 653.
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process, he can pursue a judicial remedy for breach of the union's duty
of fair representation. This serves to circumvent the exhaustion de-
fense. 5s
Though the Vaca decision provided the employee with an exception
to the general rule that established contractual procedures must be
adhered to,59 it erected a formidable wall to recovery by an employee
who asserts the necessary breach of duty by the union. The criteria
for finding a breach of duty by the union, i.e., action which is "arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,"60 places a considerable eviden-
tiary burden on the grievant. What ostensibly appears to be a weaken-
ing of the union's authority in contract administration is, in fact, a
narrow and unclear remedy to redress union action which is grossly
unfair to its members.
B. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
A suit in either state or federal courts for the breach of the duty of
fair representation can be brought pursuant to the provisions of section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.6 ' The Supreme Court
originally held in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elect. Corp. 2 that an individual could not bring a suit
based upon section 301 if he was not directly a party to the collective
bargaining contract. But the Court reversed itself in Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n,13 saying that individuals could bring such an action when
they were employed under a general collective bargaining agreement.
Since diversity of citizenship and dollar amount in controversy are not
jurisdictional prerequisites to a section 301 suit, this section provides
many individuals an opportunty for redress in the federal courts.6 4 But
58. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-88 (1967).
59, Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 987 (1968).
60. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
61. Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to citizenship of the parties.
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
62. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
63. 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
64. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1964). This section also "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for
the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements ...." Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957). See also Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
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the grievance systems in most collective bargaining agreements provide
for a final settlement-usually by arbitration-which will still serve as
a defense to court action.
The constitutional basis for section 301 is the Interstate Commerce
Clause. Commerce is defined in broad terms by the Act,65 and courts
have interpreted the definition to cover all employers large enough to
have contact with organized labor.6 In construing the same definition
of commerce in the National Labor Relations Act, 67 the Supreme Court
in NLRB v. Fainblatt68 said, "We can perceive no basis for inferring
any intention of Congress to make the operation of the Act depend on
any particular volume of commerce affected more than to which courts
would apply the maxim de minimis."6 19
C. National Labor Relations Board Proceedings
A majority of the Supreme Court in Vaca modified, sub silentio, the
Miranda Fuel doctrine by finding that concurrent jurisdiction reposed
in both the courts and the NLRB.70 A cogent reason given by the
majority of the Court for not finding exclusive jurisdiction in the
NLRB was the extent of discretion possessed by the NLRB's General
Counsel in the issuance of complaints.71 Three Justices, concurring
in result, disagreed on this issue and explicitly stated that the breach
65. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 501(3), 29 U.S.C. § 142(3)
(1964) adopts the definition of "commerce" in the National Labor Relations Act § 2(6),
29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1964). "The term 'industry affecting commerce' means any industry
or activity in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct com-
merce ... or the free flow of commerce." Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act) § 501(1), 29 U.S.C. § 142(1) (1964). "It is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction [under
section 301] if the union only is involved in an industry affecting commerce." Block
Pontiac, Inc. v. Condando, 274 F. Supp. 1014, 1018 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
66. Compare Schlecht v. Hiatt, 271 F. Supp. 644 (D. Ore. 1967), with Local Joint Exec.
Bd., Bartenders Int'l Union v. Joden, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 390 (D. Mass. 1966).
67. § 2(6), 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1964).
68. 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
69. Id. at 607.
70. We ... assume for present purposes that ... a breach of duty by the union is
an unfair labor practice . . . .The employee's suit against the employer, however,
remains a § 301 suit, and the jurisdiction of the courts is no more destroyed by the
fact that the employee, as part and parcel of his § 301 action, finds it necessary to
prove an unfair labor practice by the union, than it is by the fact that the suit may
involve an unfair labor practice by the employer himself. . . . [Ilf, to facilitate his
case, the employee joins the union as a defendant, the situation is not substantially
changed.
Vaca v. Sipes, 586 U.S. 171, 186-87 (1967) (emphasis added). "[The courts may also fashion
remedies for . . . a breach of duty." Id. at 188.
71. Id. at 182.
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of the duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.72
The General Counsel derives his discretionary authority from the
National Labor Relations Act73 which requires him to issue a com-
plaint in order to initiate Board proceedings.74 The General Counsel
has delegated75 the complaint issuing authority to Regional Counsel
with a right of appeal from their decisions to the General Counsel. 70
Once the General Counsel has refused to issue a complaint, his decision
is not reviewable in the courts.77
This lack of an appeal from the General Counsel's exercise of dis-
cretion clearly works to the disadvantage of the employee in securing
a complaint. It is indicative of the NLRB's greater concern with the
employer-union relationship than with the resolution of day-to-day
contract grievances between the employee and his union or employer.78
In other words, an unfair labor practice proceeding is directed more
72. Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Fortas, and Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the
result sa)ing "a complaint by an employee that the union has breached its duty of fair
representation is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. It is a charge of
unfair labor practice." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 198 (1967). If conduct is characterized
as an unfair labor practice, the National Labor Relations Act has pre-empted most state
redress. See National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964); note 17 supra.
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1964).
74. National Labor Relations Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1964) provides that the
General Counsel "shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the
investigation of charges and issuance of complaints ...."
75. "After a charge has been filed, if it appears to the regional director that formal
proceedings in respect thereto should be instituted, he shall issue and cause to be served
upon all the other parties a formal complaint in the name of the Board . ... 29 C.F.R.
I 10215 (1968).
76 "If, after the charge has been filed, the regional director declines to issue a com-
plaint, he shall so advise the parties in writing, accompanied by a simple statement of
the procedural or other grounds. The person making the charge may obtain a review
of such action by filing a request therefor with the general counsel ------ 29 C.F.R.
£ 102.19 (1968).
77, See Ma)er v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1968); United Elec. Contractors Ass'n
v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967); Dunn v.
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 307 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1962). For arguments that the General
Counsel's decisions should be subject to some type of review, see Booker & Coe, The
Labor Board and its Reformers, 18 LAi3. L.J. 67, 72 (1967).
78. "The public interest in effectuating the policies of the federal labor laws, not the
wrong done the individual employee, is always the Board's principal concern in fashion-
ing unfair labor remedies." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 n.8 (1967). "Through the
years the Board and the courts have stressed repeatedly that the function of the Board is
the vindication of public as distinguished from private rights." Fanning, Individual
Rights in the Negotiation and Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 19
LeA. LJ. 224, 225 (1968).
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at the contract negotiation process than at contract administration.
Once again the group rights of the exclusive bargaining agent prevail,
and minor confrontations with management are avoided, although
considerable hardship may be imposed on the employee.
IV. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN A SECTION 301 SUIT
If the employee did not have his claim fully processed in the griev-
ance system, or if the employee's claim was unsuccessfully processed
through the final step, usually his only remaining remedy is to state a
"new" claim against his union under section 301 for breach of the
duty of fair representation." If the employee was wrongfully dis-
charged, he can always sue the employer for breach of contract.
In a section 301 fair representation suit, the employee will often sue
both the employer and the union by alleging a conspiracy in which
the employer illegally discharged the employee and the union refused
to invoke the grievance procedures.80 This has been the most success-
ful way to state a breach of the duty and refers to the situation in
which the duty was clearly meant to apply. Here no group rights of the
employees could be advanced by refusing the employee his action. The
suit would dearly involve the infringement of the representation right
between the employee and his union. Since this relationship is basic
to the concept of a union, there can be no countervailing group rights
present.
In a suit alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation against
only the union, one court passed on the non-joinder of the employer
and held that the employer was an indispensable party.81 In Vaca the
79. See, e.g., Meola v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 246 Md. 226, 228 A.2d 254 (1967).
80. See, e.g., Chasis v. Progress Mfg. Co., 382 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1967).
81. Kress v. Teamsters Local 776, 42 F.R.D. 643 (M.D. Pa. 1967). The district court felt
bound by its circuit court's holding in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966). The Third Circuit held that
"t]he indispensable party doctrine is not procedural. It declares substantive law and
accords a substantive right to a person to be joined as a party to an action when his
interests or rights may be affected by its outcome. The indispensable party doctrine is
beyond the reach of, and not affected by, Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure ... "Id. at 805 (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the circuit court in Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968). Even though the procedural rule
applicable during the district court proceeding was rewritten and a new version adopted
on July 1, 1966, while the appeal was pending before the Third Circuit, the Supreme
Court said, "[t]he majority in the Court of Appeals did not purport to rely on the older
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Court said that "the employer may (and probably should be) joined
as a defendant in the fair representation Suit."8 2 This joinder may be
desirable to avoid unnecessary litigation and because the duty of fair
representation is tempered by the union-employer relationship in the
federal labor policy. Another reason is that an effective remedy will
probably involve the employer.83
version, but on its conclusion that the Rule, in either form, had no application to this
case." Id. at 116-17 n.12.
The Kress Court also ignored Rule 19. It noted that "it cannot be said that in the
absence of the employer, a judgment would have no injurious effect on its interests.
Clearly, the employer's actions started this whole controversy. The absence of the em-
plo)er would make the fashioning of relief almost impossible, since the possible relief
may be arbitration, damages or other equitable relief. The interests of the employer are
inextricably tied in to [sic] this action and thus the employer is an indispensable party."
Kress v. Teamsters Local No. 776, supra at 647 (emphasis added).
However, the Provident Tradesmens Court, besides holding that Rule 19 was ap-
plicable, said that the possibility that a non-joined party's interest "may be affected" is
not a proper standard. Such a party's interests "must, unavoidably, be affected by a
decree" in order to call the party "indispensable." Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Patterson, supra at 125. Thus, the Kress court, in adhering to the Third Circuit's
decision in Provident Tradesmen, stated invalid law.
Kress also relied on language from Vaca that ostensibly supports a finding that the
employer is an indispensable part) in a typical fair representation suit. Kress v. Team-
sters Local 776, supra at 646-47. The Vaca Court said that "the employer may be (and
probably should be) joined as a defendant in the fair representation suit .... " Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967). But the Court in Vaca was less concerned with the em-
ployer's interests than with the union's interests. The Court goes on to say that even if
the union could be indemnified by the employer, it would still be a hardship on the
union to pay damages attributable to a breach of contract by the employer. Indeed, the
Court emphasized its concern for the union's interests by encouraging joinder. "With
the employee assured of direct recovery [for breach of the contract] from the employer,
we see no merit in requiring the union to pay the employer's share of the damages." Id.
The fact that the Court in Vaca encouraged joinder of the employer goes only to the
sufliciency of the relief for the aggrieved employee. The Court in Provident Tradesmen,
unconcerned with an) substantive rights of a non-joined party, again adverted to the
matter as one concerning the adequacy of the plaintiff's remedy because the absent party
could not be bound. "[Flor dearly the plaintiff, who himself chose both the forum and
the parties defendant, will not be heard to complain about the sufficiency of the relief
obtainable." Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, supra at Ill.
Since the issues of adequacy of relief and substantive rights of non-joined parties have
been settled by Provident Tradesmen, it is clear that Kress has no vitality as an inter-
pretation of indispensable parties. Kress is also doubtful authority as an interpretation
of Vaca because it requires joinder of the employer in the typical fair representation
suit. It is interesting to note that in Vaca, even though the employer was not a party,
the Supreme Court did not hold the non-joinder a reason for its reversal. But cf. Bennie
v. Pastor, 393 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1968).
82. Vaca i. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967).
83. Id. Where the employer and union had acted together in the unfair labor practice,
the liabilit) was held to be joint and several. NLRB v. Campbell Soup Co., 378 F.2d 259
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The Vaca Court noticed that a separate suit was instituted in the
state courts against the employer for the discharge of the employee.
That action was still pending in a pretrial stage when the Supreme
Court decided the fair representation issue.84 If the fair representation
case does not involve the merits of the underlying grievance then the
two cases should not be combined because any fault would clearly in-
volve only the union. Also, to prevent confusion in standards and
elements of proof in the two actions separate trials would be required.
But if the breach of the duty of fair representation is the result of con-
certed action between the union and the employer, it would be desirable
that the actions be consolidated and the parties joined for trial. It
would be destructive of the union's position, though, to join as defen-
dants the union and employer unless they were acting cooperatively.
To force the union and employer to oppose the employee would tend
to weaken the traditional union-employer relationship and subvert
the adversary or bargaining nature of their roles in contract negotia-
tion.
Since the duty of fair representation runs from the union to the em-
ployee, any breach of that duty should logically be redressed between
the two parties. A problem arises, though, when the employee has
been discharged as a result of the union's breach of its duty by not
processing a meritorious grievance. As part of his remedy, the employee
usually wishes to be reinstated but this is within the control of the
employer. In these cases the courts will eventually have to face the
situation in which reinstatement is the only effective remedy, but no
fault on the part of the employer in the handling of the grievance can
be shown. The Supreme Court in Vaca said that in such a situation
reinstatement could not be the remedy as each party must be respon-
sible only for its own faults.8 5 The net effect, then, is that the employee
cannot get his job back unless the abuse is the result of concerted
action between the union and the employer.
Although both union and employer should be joined as defendants
in order to obtain meaningful relief, in practice it will be difficult to
show fault on the part of the employer except by a conspiracy. If the
employee has been discharged and this action affirmed by the arbitrator
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 900 (1967); see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 n.18 (1967).
But see NLRB v. Lexington Elec. Products Co., 283 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 845 (1961).
84. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 176 n.4 (1967).
85. Id. at 197.
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in the grievance system, the employer has probably abided by the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The employer may have
wrongfully discharged the employee and be in breach of contract, and
the union may have breached its duty of fair representation by proces-
sing the claim in a perfunctory manner, but there would be no con-
nection between the actions of these parties. Notwithstanding the lack
of concerted action, a final and binding arbitration decision affirming
the employer's action is conclusive as to the issue of the employer's
fault 8 6 There would be no grounds to require the employer to grant
reinstatement.8 7 In such a case the employee, deprived of his job by
two parties acting independently, has no way to regain it through the
courts. So, if the employee sues his union alone under section 301
alleging breach of the duty of fair representation, he must abandon any
hope of binding the employer or securing reinstatement by court order.
Since the duty of fair representation in contract administration arises
from the notion of a collective bargaining agreement, 8 the employee is
required to use the administrative grievance procedures provided by
that agreement. If the employee has not or cannot invoke the griev-
ance system, he must at least have attempted to do so by requesting the
union to process his grievance.8 9 If the employee has done neither, he is
subject to a defense based on his failure to exhaust his remedies created
by the collective bargaining contract.9 0 Assuming exhaustion of griev-
ance procedures or an attempt by the individual to have the union
invoke the administrative procedures, the employee must show that
the union's conduct was "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith"
in order to state a cause of action.9 1 Unions have successfully defended
these charges in many cases, because the courts have refused to equate
86. Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966).
87. The Vaca Court does not face the reinstatement problem realistically. It said, "there
is no reason to exempt the employer from contractual damages which he would other-
wise have had to pay. . . . The difficulty lies in fashioning an appropriate scheme of
remedies." 386 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added). "The employee should have no difficulty
recovering these damages from the employer who cannot, as we have explained, hide
behind the union's wrongful failure to act." Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
88. Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 YALE
L.J. 1215, 1233 (1964).
89. See, e.g., Brown v. Truck Drivers & Helpers Local No. 355, 264 F. Supp. 776 (D. Md.
1967).
90. Steen v. Local 163, UAWV, 373 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1967); Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg-
T.J. Kurdle Co,, 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958) and cases cited therein. But see Williams
v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968).
91. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
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bad faith with the refusal to process a meritorious grievance or claim.92
In Vaca the Court said no "individual employee has an absolute right
to have his grievance taken to arbitration." 93 This approach recognizes
the group interests and "furthers the interest of the union as statutory
bargaining agent and as co-author of the bargaining agreement.""'' If
the union can be second-guessed by the courts on all its grievance de-
cisions, it will have no bargaining position and will lack the respect
necessary to perform its function of contract negotiation.95
If an employee can meet the test of a breach of the duty of fair
representation, he should be entitled to punitive as well as compen-
satory damages. Since one purpose of punitive damages is the deter-
rence of malicious action,96 whether contractual97 or tortious, the proof
of the breach-union conduct which is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or
in bad faith"-should automatically show that the employee has been
the subject of malicious action.98 If one can analogize from employer-
union section 301 suits for breach of contract, punitive damages were
a possible remedy where the parties' relationship was expected to
continue, thus giving effect to deterrence in their future dealings.90
In Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753,100 the award-
ing of punitive damages in a section 301 suit was not sanctioned as a
form of punishment.10 1 Should the court in Sidney Wanzer apply such
a "relationship" analysis in a section 301 suit involving an employer-
union situation, it would also be conscious in a fair representation suit
of the role that group rights play in a federal labor policy.
The rationale of exemplary or punitive damages in Sidney Wanzer
92. See, e.g., Palmieri v. United Steelworkers of America, 270 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Pa.
1967).
93. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Foltz v. Harding Glass Co., 263 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
96. C. McCoRmicK, DAMAGES § 77, at 276 (1935); Comment, Punitive Damages in State
Courts for Acts Constituting Unfair Labor Practices Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 6
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 421, 427-33 (1959). Revenge and compensation comprise the other two
theories of punitive damages. Id. at 428-30.
97. See Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 284 (1959).
98. This is especially true in a situation that cannot be easily classified as either
"contract" or "tort." See 5 A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACTs § 1077, at 440 (1964). See also Note,
Labor Law-The Duty of Fair Representation, 7 WAsHBuRN L.J. 78, 86 (1967).
99. Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 249 F. Supp. 664, 671 8- n.5
(N.D. Ill. 1966).
100. 249 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
101. Sidney Wanzer & Sons v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 249 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. IlL. 1966).
But see Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir.
1962); cf. Hall v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 281 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Calif. 1968).
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may be generally applicable to fair representation suits. Such a ratio-
nale of punitive damages is consistent with the fair representation test
of extreme abuse of, or discrimination against, the individual employee.
The only remaining question in regard to the award of punitive dam-
ages is whether or not punitive damages are relief fashioned "from the
policy of our national labor laws. 10 2 If a court feels that punitive dam-
ages will cripple a union financially or destroy its prestige, it will
probably deny the damages even though there is no severance of the
union-employee relationship. This could be rationalized as necessary in
order to protect and foster the concept of the exclusive bargaining
agent. Such a case would provide a clear-cut example in which the duty
of fair representation is tempered by the union's group-oriented func-
tion of contract negotiation.
Presently, it is doubtful that courts will award punitive damages to
an aggrieved employee in the typical fair representation suit. If, how-
ever, a well-established union with independent financial resources
breaches its duty of fair representation, group rights may actually be
benefitted by the award of punitive damages to an aggrieved employee.
This situation could occur when the union is acting only to benefit
business interests that arise from the institution itself and not from the
role of representing its members. In such a case, courts should not
hesitate to award punitive damages.
Punitive damages seem even more equitable when the merits of the
underlying grievance or claim are not in issue, and the union has in-
voked the defense of mere negligence in the processing of the grievance.
Proof of negligent processing neither meets the test of breach of the
duty of fair representation10 3 nor does it show malicious wrongdoing.104
Also, the possibility of large punitive damages might reduce the number
102. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957); see Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187-88 (1967).
103. It was once thought that negligence would support a cause of action for breach
of the duty of fair representation. Zdero v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 338 Mich. 549, 554, 61 N.W.2d
615, 618 (1953); Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 466, 88 A.2d 851, 856 (1952), over-
ruled on other grounds, Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963);
Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 75 N.J. Super. 383, 393-94, 183 A.2d 415, 420-21 (Super. Ct.
1962), afl'd on other grounds, 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963); Falsetti v. Local No. 2026,
UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 171, 161 A.2d 882, 895 (1960) (dictum) (by implication). A union has
not breached its duty of fair representation by "a mistake in interpreting the bargaining
contract." Pekar v. Local No. 181, United Brewery Workers, 311 F.2d 628, 637 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 912 (1963). See Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective
Labor Relations, 45 CoRN. L.Q. 25 (1959).
104. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 79 (1935).
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of meritorious claims negligently processed thus avoiding any future
animosity between the union and its members.
The court could always award compensatory damages as in Thomp-
son v. Machinists Lodge 1049.105 The court there limited the damages
imposed on the employer in accordance with Vaca'00 to those caused by
the employer. Since the employee would have been laid off in the
future, and he had mitigated'07 his damages by obtaining another job,
the damages were the ordinary employment contract damages.' 08
V. INCONSISTENCIES IN THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 301
The Supreme Court has held that federal and state courts have con-
current jurisdiction in fair representation suits under section 301.100
However, state courts are required to apply federal standards even
though deciding cases which may be essentially contractual and pre-
sumably controlled by state law.110 By adopting a single set of stand-
ards, the Supreme Court hoped that uniformity would prevail in a
situation that is national in scope and respects no state boundaries.
In section 301 suits-both ordinary contract suits and fair repre-
sentation suits-courts have not always appeared to be promoting uni-
formity in their interpretations of section 301. While most of the cases
have not involved the duty of fair representation, they are never-
105. 258 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1966).
106. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967).
107. In seeking new employment the employee is held "only to reasonable exertions
in this regard, not the highest standard of diligence." NLRB v. Arduini Mfg. Corp., 394
F.2d 420, 423 (1st Cir. 1968). See also Isis Plumbing 8, Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 716
(1962) (interest on back pay awards), enforcement denied on other grounds, 322 F.2d 913
(9th Cir. 1963); F.V. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950) (back pay and reinstatement).
108. It has been said of the National Labor Relations Act that:
loss of pay [is to] be computed on the basis of each separate calendar quarter or
portion thereof .... Loss of pay shall be determined by deducting from a sum equal
to that which [the employee] would normally have earned for each such quarter or
portion thereof, [his] net earnings, if any, in other employment during that period.
Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability
for any other quarter.
F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289, 292-93 (1950). "[Iln an action by the employee
against the employer for a wrongful discharge, a deduction of the net amount of what
the employee earned, or what he might reasonably have earned in other employment of
like nature, from what he would have received had there been no breach, furnishes the
ordinary measure of damages." 5 S. WI.LrON, CONTRACTS § 1358, at 3811 (rev. ed. 1937).
Accord, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 836 (1932).
109. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 868 U.S.
502 (1962); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Teamsters Local 174 v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
110. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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theless important because section 301 is the ordinary vehicle in fair
representation cases which confers the jurisdiction to fashion relief.
A. Statute of Limitations
Section 301 contains no statute of limitations. While this may have
been a legislative oversight, one is wary to seize on this as a reason for
such an omission in federal legislation. In the past, such an omission
has been found to indicate a congressional "intent" that the state law
should be adopted to complete the statute.' In International Union,
UA W v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,"2 the Supreme Court came to this
conclusion and adopted a state statute of limitations in a section 301
suit. The Court said, however, that it adopted this method of limiting
the time period in which to bring suit because it did not wish to legis-
late in this area."1 3 The Court recognized that its holding would pro-
duce the vice of non-uniformity which Congress had intended to pre-
vent by enacting federal labor laws." 4 However, the Court felt that
11. E.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947) (National Bank Act).
112. 383 U.S. 696 (1966). In Hoosier, the union and the company executed a collective
bargaining contract that contained a section governing vacations. One clause, dealing
with accumulated vacation pay, provided that "[e]mployees who qualified for a vacation
in the previous year and whose employment is terminated for any reason before the
vacation is taken will be paid that vacation at time of termination." Id. at 698. Prior to
the expiration of the collective bargaining contract the company terminated the employ-
mest of 100 emplo)ees covered by its provision but did not pay them accumulated va-
cation pay. Two suits were brought in Indiana courts to recover the vacation pay. Both
actions were held defective under Indiana law. The union then filed an action in the
United States District Court after nearly seven years had elapsed since the employees
left the company. The District Court regarded the action as "based partly upon the
written collective bargaining agreement and partly upon the oral employment contract
each employee had made" with the company. Id. at 699. As a result of such characteriza-
tion, the court applied the six-year Indiana statute of limitations governing contracts
not in writing. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-601 (1967). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court. The union contended, inter alia, that if Indiana law was to be applied, the twenty-
year limitation (IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-602 (1967)) was appropriate since a section 301 suit
is bottomed on a written collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed
saying that the collective bargaining agreement did characterize the action as a sec-
tion 501 suit under Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962), but that the nature
of the action somehow changes after jurisdiction attaches. The Court said that "[p]roof
of the breach and the measure of damages . . . both depend upon proof of the existence
and duration of separate employment contracts between the employer and each of the
agrieved employees." International Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., supra at
706. Three justices dissented saying that "courts are expected to develop the law of labor
contracts .... " Id. at 710 (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 702-703.
114. Id. at 701. See also Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). But
ci. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957) where the Court said
"[t]he legislative history of § 301 is somewhat cloudy and confusing."
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this expression of intent by Congress was not sufficient to enable the
Court to enter this particular area.
As a further justification for not fashioning a statute of limitations
"from the policy of our national labor laws," 115 the Court stated that
the problem of limitations was not significant:
The need for uniformity . . . is greatest where its absence would
threaten the smooth functioning of those consensual processes that
federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote-the formation
of the collective agreement and the private settlement of disputes
under it. For the most part, statutes of limitations come into play
only when those processes have already broken down. Lack of
uniformity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in any im-
portant way the achievement of any single goal of labor policy.110
However, if federal labor standards are to be applied by all courts to
gain uniformity, why did the Court not "incorporate" the six month
statute of limitations applicable to unfair labor practices? 1 7 This
would be the ideal solution in a fair representation case when the
"new"" 8 Miranda Fuel doctrine applied." It must be remembered,
though, that Hoosier was not a fair representation case. The Court
could yet find that the six month limitation applicable to unfair labor
practices also applies to section 301 suits if the breach of the duty of
fair representation involved an unfair labor practice.
The application of state statutes of limitations would not be a step
towards uniformity. 20 If an employee chose the unfair labor practice
proceeding rather than a section 301 suit, there would be a senseless
inconsistency if both actions required proof of an unfair labor practice
but allowed different time periods in which to do so. Also, the short
statute of limitations for unfair labor practices-six months-will force
most of the "new" Miranda Fuel doctrine cases away from the Board
115. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
116. International Union, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966).
117. [N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more
than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a
copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless the person
aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the
armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the day
of his discharge.
National Labor Relations Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964).
118. The original Miranda Fuel doctrine called for the redress of a breach of the duty
of fair representation as an unfair labor practice. The "new" Miranda Fuel doctrine, as
announced in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), permits judicial redress even if the
breach of the duty of fair representation includes an unfair labor practice.
119. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
120. See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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and into the courts. Miranda Fuel will not need to be overruled; it
will be the victim of atrophy.
B. Norris-LaGuardia Act
It seems strange that any court could decide that section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act'" is not a part of the federal labor policy. But
this is, in effect, what is being done in some section 301 suits brought
in state courts.12 2 If, for example, an employer seeks an injunction to
enforce a "no-strike" clause of a collective bargaining agreement in
the state courts, some courts have held that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act's section 4 prohibition of injunctions is not binding upon state
courts.123 This issue is usually decided in the context of a motion to
remove12 4 to the federal district court.
In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735125 an employer secured a tem-
porary injunction from a Tennessee court enjoining the union and
its members from violating a "no-strike" clause in the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The union petitioned the federal district court
under section 1441(b) for removal. 26 The employer's motion to re-
mand to the state court was denied, and the district court granted the
121. Norris- LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964) provides that:
4. No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in
such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in
concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of em-
plo; ment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving
fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests
in a labor dispute.
A violation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is not enjoinable in a
federal suit because it is a "labor dispute" within the broad definition of that term in
the Act. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1964).
122. Compare McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d
45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958), with Independent Oil Workers
v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 85 N.J. Super. 453, 205 A.2d 78 (Super. Ct. 1964).
123. See, e.g., American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., IUOE, 338 F.2d 837
(3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
124. The federal removal statute provides for the removal to the United States District
Courts of "[amuy civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the . . . laws of the United States ..... 28 U.S.C.
* 1441(b) (1964).
125. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
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union's motion to dissolve the state court's injunction.127 The em-
ployer then appealed.128 The Sixth Circuit declined to follow the Third
Circuit's holding in American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div.,
IUOE 29 that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not applicable to the state
courts.130 Instead, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court and in
dictum said "the remedies available in State Courts are limited to the
remedies available under Federal law.' 3 ' Because of this conflict
among the circuit courts the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Avco.
In deciding Avco, however, the Supreme Court refused to consider
the issue of injunctive relief. The Court's choice of words stresses its
mechanical approach in order to avoid dealing with the knotty prob-
lem of available remedies consistent with a federal labor policy:
It is.. . clear that the claim under this collective agreement is
one arising under the "laws of the United States" within the
meaning of the removal statute .... It likewise seems clear that
this suit is within the "original jurisdiction" of the District
Court .... 132
Once the federal district court had jurisdiction, it followed that the
court had the power to dissolve a state court's injunction under its
federal equity powers. 33
Despite avoiding the main issue of whether injunctive relief could be
granted in the state courts, three members of the Court stated that
the remedies issue would be decided "upon an appropriate future oc-
casion.' 3 4 The majority opinion suggests, in a footnote, that the "oc-
casion" must be a state court decision granting an injunction in a
situation that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits a federal court from
doing So.135 The Court did recognize, however, that removal would
127. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 263 F. Supp. 177 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
128. The order dissolving the state court's injunction was appealable only under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1964) because it was not a "final decision" within 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1964). An order denying remand to the state court is not appealable, American Dredging
Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., IUOE, 338 F.2d 837, 838 n.2 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 880
U.S. 935 (1965), and "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise" except for civil-rights cases removed
under section 1443. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1964).
129. 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
130. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 376 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1967), af'd on other
grounds, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
131. Id. at 343.
132. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (emphasis added).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1964).
134. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 562 (1968) (concurring opinion).
135. Id. at 560 n.2.
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also be available in such a case.136 Hence, in all probability, such an
"occasion" to directly announce the addition of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to the federal labor policy will not arise137 because the case will be
removed to the federal district court.
While the cases previously discussed do not specifically involve sec-
tion 301 suits for fair representation, the removal issue points out the
problems of uniformity that are yet unresolved at a time when the fair
representation cases are being taken away from the NLRB, a forum
designed to foster uniformity.
C. Forum Shopping
Vaca could easily promote needless forum shopping because it per-
mits suits in both state and federal courts as well as unfair labor prac-
tice proceedings before the NLRB. The federal removal statute138
and the short statute of limitations for unfair labor practices, however,
will probably force most of the litigation into the federal courts and
hence eliminate what appears to be a multitude of forums. 139 Even
though state courts have jurisdiction, they must apply the standards
of a federal labor policy. But if a goal of the federal labor policy is an
expansion of the availability of forums for the abused employee,140
then it would seem that uniformity and the federal goals are by their
very nature inconsistent.
CONCLUSION
If an employee is not grossly abused by his employer, the usual
contractual remedies provided by the collective bargaining agreement's
grievance system are probably adequate to satisfy his claim. But if the
employee does not feel he has been fairly represented in this process
by his union, the procedures to then gain redress are few and un-
certain. The employee's section 301 suit for breach of the duty of fair
representation is limited by the high standards for proof of such a
breach delineated by the Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes. The un-
136. Id.
137. "ET]he Norris-LaGuardia Act has been considered a cornerstone of our national
labor policy." Stern, The Norris-La Guardia Act and State Court Injunctions Against
Strikes in Breach of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Under Section 301: Accommo-
dation vs. Incompatibility, 39 Ta.Np. L.Q. 65, 75 (1965).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
139, Notes 125-37 supra and accompanying text.
140. Textile Workers Union x. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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reviewable discretion of the NLRB's General Counsel in the issuance
of complaints makes the initiation of unfair labor practice proceedings
doubtful at best.
The duty of fair representation as announced by Vaca promulgates
a remedy that is bounded by the superior federal labor policy of pro-
tecting group rights. The individual will not be allowed to seek redress
for a private injury when the result will tend to destroy the union's
function of advancing group rights in contract negotiation. Even the
NLRB seems to regard the duty of fair representation in the context
of day-to-day contract administration and hence too trivial to warrant
extensive concern that would perhaps impinge upon its supposedly
more fundamental role in union-management relations.
The availability of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act increases
the grievant's chances for redress by providing a ready vehicle for access
to the federal courts. 141 However, even though jurisdiction for relief
of a breach of the duty of fair representation is no obstacle to recovery
by the employee, the procedural requirements and burden of proof
standards enunciated by Vaca are formidable barriers to any meaning-
ful relief.
While it appears that the duty of fair representation is well estab-
lished in principle, "new" matters have emerged since Vaca that still
prevent an employee's recovering from his union. Any of these "road-
blocks" can be used by the courts to deny relief to the employee if
there is danger that a recovery will affect the union's function of re-
presenting group rights. Thus, beneath the protective veil of the duty
of fair representation there still lies the majority-rule concept142 that
compels the election of an exclusive bargaining agent for contract ne-
gotiation. This concept is "unquestionably at the center of our federal
labor policy,"' 43 and it surely tempers the duty of fair representation.
141. "[E]xperience has shown that [the duty of fair representation] gives almost no pro.
tection to the individual .... [I]t is almost without exception a form of words which
holds the promise to the ear and breaks it to the heart." Summers, Individual Rights in
Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362, 410 n.188 (1962).
142. The question of what constitutes a "majority" is beyond the scope of this note.
See Hope, "Majority Choice"-What Does it Mean?, 18 LAB. L.J. 515 (1967).
143. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in
a Federal System, 67 YALE hJ. 1327, 1333 (1958).
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